This paper argues that barriers affect both the beginning date and the subsequent pace of modern growth, and taking into account this fact enriches our knowledge of cross-country income differences. The model matches the observed inverted U-shape of cross-country income differences, which implies that a substantial fraction of current income differences is transitional. Hence, the model requires smaller barriers to account for current income differences relative to models that focus only on steady states. Empirically, I find that differences in the beginning dates of modern growth explain large differences in incomes.
Introduction
Models of international income differences focus on the steady state effect of barriers to capital accumulation and technology adoption 1 ignoring an important long run development fact: countries that have experienced modern growth (a sustained increase in per capita output) also experienced a long period of extensive growth (growth in aggregate terms but stagnation in per capita terms) before it. Moreover, countries entered modern growth at different points in time. A parallel literature studies development paths but with no reference to international income differences. 2 In this paper, I bring elements from both literatures and study the international income differences implied by differences in development paths.
I argue that some countries are poor because of bad institutions or policies that act as barriers to technology adoption and capital accumulation. My key contribution to this literature is to study the implications of an overlooked consequence of these barriers: the delay in the process of transition from extensive growth to modern growth. I introduce barriers into the Hansen and Prescott (1999) model and show that barriers in this model lower the level of income along the balanced growth path and, more importantly, delay the economy's turning point from extensive to modern growth. Because of this second effect, cross-country income differences exhibit an inverted U-shape pattern over time. A key implication is that a substantial fraction of existing income differences is transitional, and so smaller barriers are required to account for the observed large cross-country income differences relative to models that focus only on steady states. This transitional effect increases significantly when I include the fact that today's low-income countries have higher population growth rates during their early development stage than did tody's high income countries. 1 This literature generally focuses on policies that distort capital accumulation ( e.g., Mankiw et al., (1992) , Chari et al., (1997) , Parente et al., (2000) ), technology adoption ( e.g., Parente and Prescott (1994) ), and level of total factor productivity (e.g., Hall and Jones (1999) , Prescott (1998) , Parente and Prescott (1999) , and Baier et al., (2003) ). McGrattan and Schmit (1998) provided a survey of papers on cross country income differences.
2 An exception is the work of Lucas (2002) which uses the model by Tamura (1996) to study the evolution of the relative income distribution by assigning turning points exogenously, and finds that income inequality exhibits an inverted U-shape. In my model the turning point is endogenously determined. Models on transition from stagnation to modern growth includes Becker et al., (1990) , Goodfriend and McDermott (1995) , Galor and Weil (1998) , Jones (1999) and Hansen and Prescott (1999) . These models differ in several aspects regarding the driving forces of the transition to modern growth and whether such transition is inevitable or not.
To illustrate the strength of this model in explaining cross-country income differences, I examine the countries in Maddison's (2001) dataset. I run two tests. First, I derive the relative size of barriers that are required to explain the observed differences in turning points between any two groups of countries. I then compare the income differences predicted by the model with the data, and find that the model accounts for about 80 percent of the income differences for most of the country groups. Second, I choose Japan to study the case of a reduction in barriers and Argentina to study the case of an increase in barriers due to documented institutional changes. The data that I used to change the barriers are historical data on the relative prices of investment goods. The predicted long run development experience for each economy matches closely the data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the long run development facts as motivation and section 3 presents the model. I discuss the role of barriers in section 4 and show the potential of the model to account for international income differences in Section 5. The empirical studies are in Section 6, and a conclusion follows in section 7.
2 Motivation Maddison's (2001) 
Group 3 includes Eastern European countries and the Former USSR, Group 4 includes
Latin American countries, Group 5 is Japan only, Group 6 is Africa and finally Group 7 includes all Asian countries except Japan. Appendix 4 provides the details.
Figure (1) shows that per capita income for all seven groups remained stagnant for a long period before starting to grow at different points in time. This stagnation is not because there was no growth in total output but because the increase in population offset the increase in output. A "Malthusian" model therefore matches well world experiences prior to the 19th century. But subsequently countries started to leave this type of stagnation and enter modern growth, I refer to the time of entry into modern growth as the turning point. World income differences were small prior to the 19th century but because of differences in turning points, they started to diverge during the 19th century, a feature emphasized by Pritchett (1997) . Figure ( 2) plots this for individual countries, which also shows large differences in the turning points. As a result of the different turning points, income differences between two countries exhibit an inverted U-shape pattern over time, a feature of the data emphasized by Lucas (2002) .
The data suggest that the timing of modern growth is crucial for understanding the observed income differences. To proceed, I use a version of Hansen and Prescott (1999) But these factors also determine income prior to the turning point. Therefore, it cannot simultaneously account for both the large differences in turning points and the small differences in pre-1800 income levels. Moreover, the model predicts that an economy with a lower level of income in the pre-modern growth stage reaches its turning point sooner, which is not consistent with the data. I argue that different institutions for investment incentives can reconcile these facts. This is because capital has a small role to play prior to modern growth, therefore, differences in investment incentives also have a small role in determining the income differences along the Malthusian path. But they can delay the adoption of the capital-intensive Solow technology and so explain large post-modern growth income differences as a result of the differences in the turning points.
The Model
I focus on barriers to capital accumulation as an explanation why countries are poor and, in the context of this paper, why modern growth begins later in some countries. 3 Barriers can take the form of taxes on investment goods, corruption or other institutional factors 3 I show later barriers to technology adoption can be introduced in the model in a similar way.
that increase the relative price of investment goods, which in turn discourages capital accumulation. In this paper, I follow Parente and Prescott and model barriers by assuming that they reduce the efficiency of transforming forgone consumption goods into usable capital goods.
Technology Output in this economy can be produced using either the Malthus or the Solow technologies. Both technologies are subject to exogenous technological change and both have constant returns to scale. The two production functions are as follows:
where K it , N it and L it denote capital, labor and land used in technology i at time t, φ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital share, µ ∈ (0, 1) is the labor share and 1 − µ − φ ∈ (0, 1) is the land share in the Malthus technology, θ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital share for the Solow technology, γ m > 1 and γ s > 1 are the growth rates while A m and A s are the initial level of total factor productivity (TFP). Land does not enter the Solow technology. Capital is assumed to depreciate completely each period. 4 Land is a fixed factor. Output of the two sectors are identical and can be used for consumption or investment. Feasibility requires
where C t is aggregate consumption, while X mt and X st are aggregate investments.
Firms in each sector are assumed to behave competitively and rent all factors of production from households. A representative firm in sector i takes the wage rate and rental rates for capital and land as given, and chooses labor, capital and land input to maximize profits.
Household Sector The model has two-period overlapping generations. Let N t be the number of young agents and c 1t be the consumption level for young agents in period t.
Population dynamics are given by N t+1 = g(c 1t )N t , where g(.) is an exogenous function that will be specified later. In period 0, there are N −1 old agents, each is endowed with 4 In the quantitative work a period is interpreted to be 35 years, so this assumption is empirically reasonable.
units of capital and 
subject to the budget constraints
where β is the discount factor and q t is the price of land in period t.
Equilibrium For given sizes of barriers, the competitive equilibrium and the dynamics are similar to those of Hansen and Prescott. 
Barriers to Development
This section highlights the role of barriers in the three development stages. Along the MBGP, the barriers to Malthus capital reduce the capital-output ratio by a factor π m . Let v m1 be the capital-output ratio for an economy with π m = 1, the output per worker along
which is constant given the assumption that population is growing at rate γ When on the MBGP, firms can determine when it is profitable to start using the Solow technology. This requires profit to be positive when the wage and rental rate of capital are at their MBGP levels. The condition is on the level of TFP in the Solow technology:
whereŵ m andr m are the constant wage and rental rate of capital along the MBGP. Let the turning point t * be the period that the Solow technology is first used. the condition implies
where B is a function of technologies and preference parameters. The existence of the turning point is independent of the relative sizes of the growth rates for the two technologies.
Since the threshold is a constant, the Solow technology will be used at some point as long as it is growing. Therefore, the model predicts that modern growth is inevitable in all When both technologies are used, the allocation of inputs must equalize marginal products across sectors. Let n * mt be the equilibrium fraction of labor in the Malthus sector. It solves
where ψ =
(1−θ)φ θµ and I t is total value of investment by the young population at time t − 1.
Assume the Solow technology is growing faster than the Malthus technology, the fraction of labor in the Malthus sector is decreasing and converges to zero. The two barriers have opposite effects on this process of structural transformation. The barriers to Solow capital slow down this process while the barriers to Malthus capital speed up this process. The effect of the symmetric barriers is captured by π θ−φ , which slow down the process.
Asymptotically, the economy behaves like a one-sector Solow growth economy. Assume the population growth rate converges to a constant rate, the economy converges to the SBGP. The barriers to Solow capital reduce the capital-output ratio by a factor π s . Let v s1
be the capital-output ratio for an economy with π s = 1. The output per worker along the SBGPof an economy with barriers π s iŝ
which is lower by a factor of π θ/(1−θ) s .
International Income Differences
Can the model account for the large observed international income differences? To answer this question, I consider two economies that are identical except for the level of their barriers:
economy 1 has π m1 = π s1 = 1, and economy 2 has π m2 = π m and π s2 = π s .
Analytical Results
In what follows I refer to the ratio of output per worker in economy 1 to output per worker in economy 2 as their income ratio. Equations (7) and (11) imply that the income ratio is In other words, even if barriers remain unchanged, the model predicts an increase in the income ratio because both economies experience a structural transformation with more capital allocated to the more capital-intensive sector.
That the two-sector barrier model generates the same long-run income ratio as the standard one-sector barrier model (as in Parente and Prescott (1994) ), but crucially for my purpose, it implies a different turning point for each economy. Equation (9) implies a relationship between the two turning points, 7 , then converges to one. For the case of symmetric barriers, the relationship between their turning points is
To be more precise, the difference in their turning point should be the minimum integer that is greater
The turning point for economy 2 occurs
periods later. The income ratio first increases from π φ/(1−φ) , then converges to π θ/(1−θ) . 8
Quantitative Results
The benchmark economy with barriers equal to one is identical to that of Hansen and
Prescott. I therefore follow their calibration strategies. Appendix 2 provides a brief review of the procedure. With the same calibrated parameters, I then compute the equilibrium path of a distorted economy with barriers bigger than one. For simplification, I assume barriers to Malthus capital equal to one. This does not change the quantitative results regarding income differences along the transition. The reason is that given that the capital share in the Malthus technology is calibrated to 0.1, the barriers to Malthus capital have very small effects on both the level of income and the turning point.
In order to set a value for the barriers to capital accumulation in the Solow technology I use Jones's (1994) estimate of the maximum relative machinery price in the Summer-
Hetson data set to that of the US for the period 1960-85, which is equal to 4. It turns out, however, that for the main focus of this paper, which is the contribution of the turning point to the differences in income, the precise value chosen for the barrier is not important.
Other authors, in particular Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1997) and Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) use the relative price of investment to consumption goods as a measure for barriers.
Restuccia and Urrutia construct a panel of the relative prices for the period 1960-85 using the Summer-Hetson data set. They find that the differences in relative prices across countries are large. The ratio between the average of the top and bottom five percent of the distribution of relative prices is 11.3 in 1960 and 6.5 in 1985. 9 I report the results for values of barriers larger than 4 and show that my results are not substantially altered.
Figures (3) - (5) summarize the quantitative results for the case of barriers equals 4.
Figures (3) shows that while the benchmark economy starts to allocate labor to the Solow sector in period 1, the Solow technology is still inactive in the distorted economy until period 3. 10 The Solow technology is actually profitable in the distorted economy between periods 2 and 3 since the right hand side of equation (12) is equal to 1.3 periods. This explains why the distorted economy allocates 70 percent (compare to 10 percent for the benchmark economy) of its labor to the Solow sector during the first period that the Solow technology is used. The inverted U-shape income ratio in the data is replicated in Figure   ( 4). The model predicts the income ratio increases from 1 to a maximum of 3.2 before declining to 2.5. Thus, a bigger income ratio is obtained (a 26 percent difference) relative to the balanced growth path level. Figure (5) shows that the growth rate of output per worker is not monotonic as in the one-sector Solow growth model. It first increases and then decreases to its balanced growth path rate. The increasing growth rate is a feature of the data emphasized by Romer (1986). 11 It is interesting to note that this model can produce such an outcome with two constant return to scale technologies.
As the barriers delay the turning point for the distorted economy, the growth rate for the benchmark economy is higher than that of the distorted economy before it starts to decrease. Thus, their income ratio increases during this period. After this point, the model predicts faster growth in the distorted economy so that the income ratio decreases. The income ratio converges to a constant when both economies converge to their SBGPs. The inverted U-shape income ratio predicted by the model provides an answer to the question raised by Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) namely, 'why the income differences remain constant in light of the decline in the level of barriers?' This is indeed a puzzle if one focuses on the one-sector barrier model, which predicts income differences should fall when the barriers fall. However, these two empirical observations can coexist in the two-sector barriers model. This is because, as I will show in section 6.2, a decline in the level of barriers may decrease only the slope of the increasing income ratio but leaving its level constant.
In this model, cross-country income differences are generated by differences in balanced 10 The fraction of capital in the Malthus sector is proportional to the fraction of labor in the Malthus sector.
11 Romer (1986) tests the trend of the growth rate using raw data from Maddison (1979) for countries with data no later than 1870. These countries include: United Kingdom, France, Denmark, United States, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Australia, Norway, Japan and Canada. He rejects the null hypothesis that there is a nonpositive trend in the growth rate for 8 out of the 11 countries at the 10 percent level.
growth path levels and differences in turning points. Income differences along the balanced growth path are smaller than along the transition from Malthus to Solow. Table (1) shows that as barriers increase, the percentage difference between the income ratio along the SBGP and the maximum income ratio increases. This is partly due to the longer delay of modern growth. For example, when the barriers are increased from 8 to 16, the delay in modern growth increases from 2 to 3 periods, and the percentage difference in the income ratio rises from 33 percent to 40 percent. To address the factor 30 income differences in the data, Table ( 2) reports the corresponding combination of capital shares and barriers that can generate a maximum income ratio of this magnitude. 12 It shows that the required size of barriers needed for a factor 30 income difference is much lower than in models that focus on the balanced growth path. For example, for θ equal to 0.4, the required level of barriers is reduced by 40 percent. The reduction holds true for other levels of θ as well. It is interesting to note that a factor 30 income difference is associated with a three-or four-period delay in the model. In other words, given that rich countries entered modern growth in 1820, the model predicts that a country that entered modern growth in 1960 would be 30 times poorer by today's standards.
I have been focusing on the barriers to capital accumulation to show that the timing of modern growth is important for understanding the large international income differences.
Alternatively, some have argued that some countries are poor because there are barriers that deter technology adoption, which in turn lowers the level of TFP. For example, Parente and Prescott (1999) have studied the role of unions as barriers to adopting better technology.
The simplest way to incorporate this barrier to technology adoption into this model is to assume the TFP for the Solow technology is A st /π A . The interpretation is that the best Solow technology is not being adopted or the barriers reduce the efficiency of using the Solow technology. At a general level, these two types of models are isomorphic in that one can choose the size of barriers such that they imply the same output per worker ratio along the balanced growth path for the two models. In particular, set π A = π θ s ,where π A and π s are the barriers to technology adoption and capital accumulation. Then, the delay in 12 To be consistent with the calibration procedure, γ s and β have to be adjusted when θ is increased.
Therefore, increasing θ need not necessarily increase the delay in modern growth as noted earlier in section 5.1. turning points implied by these two models is the same and same quantitative results apply.
The key differences lie in the representation of these two barriers in the empirical studies.
Population Profile
The previous quantitative exercise assumed population profiles are the same for both economies. My focus was to study the effect of barriers holding other factors constant.
The analysis in Appendix 3 shows that my main result is sensitive to changes in the population profile. In particular, when the maximum population growth rate is increased by 1 percent for both economies, the maximum income ratio increases from 3.2 to 3.5, a near 10 percent increase. In view of this, it is of interest to see what the data imply for the population profiles for a broader set of countries. Figure (6 ) uses the data from Table A4.1 and plots the population profile for the seven groups of countries. The x-axis is the GDP per capita in a given year relative to year 1700, which represents the stage of development of each group. The data suggest that whereas the shapes of the population profile are similar across countries, the peaks are very different. More precisely, late developers have higher peaks than early developers. While the population profiles of these countries do not affect their turning points, they may affect the path of relative income.
In this paper, I focus on the role of barriers taking the profile of the population growth rate as given without decomposing it into fertility and mortality. The interaction between mortality and fertility have been widely studied. Recent work has emphasized the role of mortality on the return to human capital and/or the role of mortality on the altuistic parent's precautionary demand for children (e.g., Ehrich and Lui (1991), Jones (1999), and Tamura (2002b) ). They argue that the falling mortality rate is the key driving force for the falling fertility rate. This literature provides an explanation to why population growth is increasing during the early development stage, and falling in the late development stage. 13 The question then is why the population growth rate for the late developers reaches a higher peak then for the early developers. 14 Coale (1979) has documented for the case of Europe, 13 In a paper with human capital accumulation, Tamura (2002b) argues that the reason that the declining population growth (and industrialization) happend sooner in the early developers is due to that fact that the TFP of industry relative to agriculture is much higher for the early developers.
14 Doepke (1999) endogenizes the fertility dynamics for the Hansen-Prescott (1999) model. However, by assuming countries have the same population growth rate at their common turning point, the differences in and Dyson and Murphy (1985) have documented for the case of other countries, that fertility rates were also increasing during this period. 15 On the other hand, Livi-Bacci (1997) shows that mortality rates at the early development stage for the late developers are more or less the same as European mortality rates. However, the fertility rates in developing countries are considerably larger than those experienced in European countries, which suggests that the difference in the peaks of population growth rate is due mainly to differential fertility rates. Cultural, religious and policy differences that affect the fertility decision may all be important for understanding Figure (6) . While understanding what accounts for these differences is of interest in its own right, I will simply take these differences as exogenous and examine their consequences for development.
I now allow the peak population growth rate to be one percent higher in the distorted economy. In other words, all the parameters are the same as before except m (the parameter corresponding to the peak population growth rate) is equal to 2.8 for the distorted economy.
As shown in Figure (7) , the income ratio increases by more than 20 percent from period 6 to 9, and the maximum income ratio increases from 3.2 to 4, which is a 25 percent increase.
Thus, it confirms the intuition that differences in the population profiles between the early and the later developers are important in accounting for their income differences.
Empirical Studies
In this section, I use the size of barriers implied by the difference in turning points to compare the predicted income ratio with the income ratio in the data. To highlights the role of barriers, I assume countries have the same preference and access to the same technology throughout. Equation (9) then tells the relationship between the turning point, barriers and the initial level of land per worker. With information on the difference in turning points, I still have three unknowns, the ratio of the barriers to Malthus capital, the ratio of the the peaks of the population growth rates cannot be addressed. 15 This increase in the total fertility rate can be decomposed into changes in marriage behavior and changes in marital fertility. Wrigley and Schofield (1981) provide evidence that in England, the marriage rate increased and age of first marriage decreased during the initial stage of industrialization. Evidence from the demography literature ( see Dyson and Murphy (1985) ), suggests that marital fertility was increasing during the early development stage and that this increase was mainly due to changes in postpartum sexual abstinence and duration of breast-feeding.
barriers to Solow capital, and the ratio of the initial level of land per worker. One way to get a solution is to make two assumptions: (1) countries have the same initial level of land per worker (l 0 ), and (2) the barriers are symmetric, or the barriers for Malthus capital (π m ) are equal to one. The size of barriers can then be derived from equation (12) . An alternative way is to observe that the effects of l 0 and π m can be summarized by the income ratio along the MBGP. This is because the turning point is derived by comparing the revenue of using the Solow technology (the Solow TFP level) with its cost (the cost of capital and labor along the MBGP), which is precisely what equation (8) says. I can rewrite this equation using the equilibrium conditions for the prices as,
where
. Thus l 0 and π m are irrelevant for the difference in turning points once the constant income ratio is known. The barriers to Solow capital can then be derived from equation (14) using the observed difference in turning points and the income ratio along the MBGP.
However, although I do not need separate information on π m and l 0 to derive the barriers to Solow capital, I need to know π m and l 0 separately to calculate the subsequent income path. In order to do this, I set π m equal to one because the capital share in the Malthus technology is sufficiently small to make π m virtually irrelevant. l 0 can then be derived from equation (7) . I now proceed to conduct the empirical exercises using the second way, i.e.
to derive the barriers to Solow capital and the initial land per worker using information on the difference in turning points and the ratio of pre-modern growth income. 16
The Seven Groups
I consider the seven groups in Figure 1 and calculate their average annual growth rates using Table A4 .1. The growth rate for Group 1 was below 0.2% for 1500-1600, 1600-1700, and 1700-1800. It increased to 1% during 1820-1870. Following Maddison, I use 1820 as 16 In Ngai (2000) , I have used the first method to study the income differences between UK, Japan and Africa (using data from Lucas (1998)). For Africa and the UK, I found that the π implied by the difference in turning points can account for about 70 percent of their current income differences. For Japan and the UK, I considered the institution reforms in Japan and showed that the model can account for both the Japanese miracle and the slowdown.
the turning point for Group 1. Since one period in the model is 35 years, the turning points for all other groups will be assigned to year 1855, 1890,..etc. Groups 2-5 all experienced a growth rate of 1% during 1870-1913. But during 1820-1870, Groups 2 and 3 both have growth rates around 0.5%, while the growth rates of Groups 4 and 5 are below 0.2%. Thus, I
assign 1855 as the turning point for both Groups 2 and 3, and 1890 for both Groups 4 and 5.
The turning point for Group 6 is 1925 since it reached a 1% growth rate during 1913-1950.
Finally, the turning point for Group 7 is 1960 given it reached a 1% growth rate during . The average income ratio between Group 1 and another group during 1500-1700 is used to match the income ratio along the MBGP of the model. Denote d i = t * i − t * 1 the difference in the turning points of Group i and Group 1, π i the level of the barriers in Group i relative to that of Group 1, and z i the average relative income of Group 1 to that of Group i during 1500-1700 which can be calculated from Table A4 .1 as
1.2 1.7 2.0 1.7 2.3 1.6
Given z i and d i , the initial land per worker for Group i is equal to z
, and the range of π i implied by equation (14) is
where π θ/(1−θ) i and γ 1/(1−θ) s are the predicted income ratio and growth rate along the SBGP.
The benchmark economy is now calibrated to Group 1, thus the peak of the population is adjusted to 1.3% as implied by Figure (6) . This implies that population in 1995 is about five times that in 1820 which matches that of Group 1. The other calibrated parameters are the same as before except that θ = 0.5. 17 This value of θ is larger than before but in accordance with many authors, e.g. Parente and Prescott, who have argued that capital shares should be higher than the canonical values because of unmeasured investment. The parameters for any Group i are identical to that of Group 1 except for the barriers and the initial land per worker. I calculate the barriers as the minimum value implied by equation 17 Thus, γ s and β are adjusted accordingly to match the growth rate and interest rate. The choice of θ will mainly affect the level of π but not the main result on income ratio. It is because the difference in turning points is already given by the data. Moeover γ s is adjusted to match the growth rate and so the income ratio along the SBGP π
is always within the range given by equation (15) regardless of the level of θ.
(15) . The barriers derived are π 2 π 3 π 4 π 5 π 6 π 7 1.5 2.0 4.0 3.5 9.5 13.5 I assume these barriers remain the same throughout the sample years. The results are summarized in Table 3 For other groups, the model performs well for the period 1820-1960. But for the period 1960-1995, the predicted incomes for Groups 5 and 7 are too low relative to that of Group 1, and the predicted incomes for Groups 3 and 6 are too high relative to that of Group 1.
The reason that the predicted income is too high for Group 3 (Eastern Europe and Former USSR) for the period 1960-1995 is that the GDP per capita for Group 3 actually fell in 1998 to half its level of 1990 for political reasons which are not in my model. The reason that the predicted incomes are too low for Groups 5 and 7 is that I have assumed the barriers to remain the same throughout the sample years. But these two groups contain most of the countries (such as Japan and South Korea) that have experienced "growth miracles" during this period. These miracle experiences are often associated with institutional reforms that may have lowered the size of barriers.
So far I have assumed all groups are identical except for the level of initial income and barriers. But as shown in Fig(6) , they have different population growth rates during their early development stage. In fact, for Group 6 (Africa), the peak population growth rate is 3 percent during the period 1950 -1995 reports the results of allowing a higher peak population growth rate for Africa. 18 It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the balanced growth path approach, the model predicts that the income ratio between Africa and Group 1 will continue to worsen even if relative barriers are unchanged. A large fraction of this increase is due to the high population growth rate. 19 With this adjustment, the percentage of income ratio (Group1/Africa) predicted by the model increases from 71 percent to 84 percent for the period 1960-1995.
To sum up, the barriers that match the observed differences in turning points and the pre-modern growth income ratio achieve the following: (1) it predicts 'convergence' among the Western countries; (2) it accounts for a significant portion of the income ratio between the current poor and current rich, especially when the different population profiles are taking into account.
Institutional Change
I now address the issue of institution changes that may have changed the size of barriers and focus on individual countries. The benchmark economy is now interpreted as the UK (a member of Group 1), which has similar population profile as that of the whole of Group 1. I make comparison with Japan and Argentina, two countries that experienced well-documented institutional changes.
The growth rate of the UK was below 0.3% before the period 1820-1870, thus 1820 is also used as the turning point for the UK. 20 I need a measure for the barriers along the long run development path. The Penn World Table covers the price of capital starting from 18 I chose to study Africa as one unit since Maddison (1995 Maddison ( , 2001 ) contains very few data for African countries prior to 1950, for four sample countries in year 1913, and two out of the four sample countries in year 1900. Moreover, they all have very similar population profiles. 19 Note that the implied ratio of output per worker is higher than that of output per capita during the period 1960-2135. In particular, for the benchmark case, the maximum ratio for output per worker is 12 and for output per capita is 11. For the case with adjusted population profile, the maximum ratio for output per worker is 18 and for output per capita is 14. 20 There are some disagreement on the turning point of the UK, but since I am using the for (for 1973-2000) .
To see the model's predictions on the development experience of Japan relative to that of the UK, I need a measure of relative barriers in Japan since the beginning of the modern growth era. Based on the difference in their turning points and the ratio of their pre-modern growth income, equation (15) can be used to derived the relative barriers in Japan when both economies are in the pre-modern growth regime. However, this level of barriers did not remain constant over time. The historical record suggests two episodes that significantly lowered barriers in Japan. They are the Meiji Restoration in 1868 which ended Shogunate Japan, and the postwar economic and institutional reforms. According to Yamamura (1977) , the new Meiji government adopted policies to encourage the absorption and dissemination of western technologies and skills, and help the growth of private industries. Following these policy changes, the fraction of workers employed in industry increased significantly in 1907. Postwar Japan also underwent many major reforms such as introducing numerous taxexemptions or tax-reliefs for investment; industry-financing programs; allowing the purchase of new foreign patents; dissolving the zaibatsu system and the deconcentration of many zaibatsu subsidiaries 22 ; and trade liberalization (see Tsuru (1961) and Rotwein (1964) ).
According to Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1963) , these reforms led to a steep rise in the rate of private investment and a rapid shift of resources from the agricultural to the nonagricultural sector. 21 The other ten countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Great Britain and the US. 22 The "zaibatsu" refers to a relatively small number of family-dominated company systems holding assets through large segments of the Japanese economy. These groups had become a major force in Japanese economic and political life before World War II.
These reductions in barriers are consistent with the data reported in Collins and Williamson.
Based on their Tables (1a) and (1b), Figure ( 9a) plots the relative price of capital goods and equipment in Japan where the relative price in 1900 is normalized to 100. Figure (9b) plots the ratio of the relative prices in Japan to that of the UK using their Tables (2a) and (2b). These two figures show that there are significant reductions in the relative prices in Japan and their ratio relative to that of the UK. This evidence is consistent with the view that barriers in Japan were reduced after the Meiji Restoration. For the postwar period, Jones (1994) shows that the relative price of equipment in Japan relative to the UK is equal to 0.7 (in 1980).
In view of these facts, I carry out the following exercise to account for the experience of Japan relative to that of the UK. As Japan experienced a two-period delay compared to the UK and its income for the period 1500-1700 is 54 percent of that in the UK, equation Table 4 compares the predictions of the model with the data for the specified periods between 1820 to 2000. The model tracks the trend of the income ratio between the UK and Japan very closely. It predicts both the divergence between Japan and UK prior to 1890 and the later convergence but the catch up of the Japanese economy happens at a slower rate than in the data. There are two points to note. First, the income ratio for the period 1850-1925 is fairly stable though the barriers are reduced by half in 1890. This is because the model predicts an inverted U-shape for the time path of the income ratio for a given level of barriers. Therefore, if the level of barriers is reduced before the maximum income ratio is reached, it will only cause the income ratio to increase at a smaller rate but not necessarily reduce it. This is an interesting property of the model and is consistent with the finding of Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) that the range of the relative price of investment is decreasing for the period 1960-85 while the magnitude of the income ratio is not. Second, the model implies both the Japanese miracle and the slowdown for the period 1960-2000 with one single change in the level of barriers in 1960. 23 Within a version of the neoclassical growth model, Parente and Prescott (1994) interpret the miracle in Japan as a reduction in its barriers to less than that of the US, while the subsequent slowdown is associated with an increase in its relative size. They argue that Japan is converging to three different balanced growth paths, corresponding to the period before the miracle, during the miracle, and the slowdown after the miracle, and they assume the existence of three different levels of barriers each corresponding to a steady state. I find, however, that the slowdown of the Japanese economy after the miracle years can be obtained without increasing the relative barriers, as part of the normal process of transition. The difference in our results highlight the difference in my approach and the standard balanced growth approach in accounting for international income differences. If we focus on balanced growth paths, differences of this magnitudes can only be explained by exogenous shocks that change the balanced growth equilibrium.
In contrast to the case of Japan, modern growth began in Argentina around the middle of 19th century. The GDP per capita of the UK relative to that of the Argentina declined Table 5 compares the prediction of the 23 The removal of barriers can only partly replicate the postwar miracle of Japan as the destruction of the capital during the war is also an important factor. 24 Díaz-Alejandro (1970) reports that the relative price of new machinery and equipment was between 2.5 and 3.3 times higher in Buenos Aires than in two major US cities for 1962. On the other hand, the relative model with the data in Maddison (1995 and 2000) for the specified period between 1870 and 1995. The model closely tracks the trend of the income ratio, i.e. it predicts convergence prior to 1925 then divergence and slowdown in the Argentine economy for the period 1925-1960 due to the increased barriers in 1925. The shortcoming is that the predicted growth rate for the period 1960-1995 is too high compared to the data.
To conclude, the institutional changes can explain why Japan reaches a higher income level than Argentina even though modern growth began later in Japan.
Conclusion
Recent studies have emphasized differences in the barriers to capital accumulation and technology adoption as determinants of cross-country income differences, but they have generally focused on steady states. In this paper I focus on the role of the barriers in determining the beginning date and pace of modern economic growth. A fundamental property of the model is that cross-country income differences exhibit an inverted U-shape pattern over time, an important feature of long run economic data. A key implication of my model is that a substantial fraction of existing income differences are transitional. The transitional effect increases significantly when I include the fact that today's low-income countries had higher population growth rates during the early development stage than did the currently rich countries. I find interesting results in my empirical tests. I divide all countries in Maddison's dataset into seven groups and I find that the barriers that account for their differences in turning points also account for a significant portion of their income differences. The case of Japan and Argentina relative to the UK, which I used to study the effect of institutional change, illustrates how the model can explain both the growth miracle and subsequent slowdown along the same development path.
The model abstracts from the fact that home production (the non-market sector) plays an important role in the early development stage of economy. Parente, Rogerson and Wright (2000) extend the standard barrier model to include home production. They find that the measured income disparity along the balanced growth path increases significantly if market price of machinery is 1.7 times higher in Argentina than in the UK in 1980 ( Jones (1994) ). Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) shows that the relative price of investment is 1.5 times higher in Argentina than in the UK for the period 1960-85.
and home produced goods are close substitutes and the capital share of the home production technology is small. Incorporating home production in this model is expected to work in a similar way as in their model.
Another interesting extension not pursued here is to allow for mortality risk and human capital accumulation, as in Tamura (2002b) . One well-known development fact is the positive correlation between average years of schooling and life expectancy across time and countries. In the context of this paper, the exogenous barriers delay modern growth and in turn delay the improvement in mortality, thus providing an endogenous barrier to human and physical capital accumulation which can explain even more income differences.
Appendix 1. Competitive Equilibrium This appendix derives the competitive equilibrium which satisfies the three development stages under assumptions A1-A6 specified below.
Given π m , π s , N 0 , K 0 and L, a competitive equilibrium consists of prices {q t , w t , r Kmt , r Kst , r Lt }; firm allocations {K mt, K st , N mt , N st , L mt , Y mt , Y st }; and household allocations {c 1t , c 2t+1 , x mt , x st , l t+1 }, such that (1) given prices, household and firm allocations maximize utility and profit; (2) all markets clear
and (3) the laws of motion hold
The model can be solved for constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution utility, but I assume
In equilibrium, c 1t = wt 1+β , and 
The price and rental rate of land grow at γ
. The wage rate and rental rate of capital are constant.
Transition A firm can write down his profit function if it starts using the Solow technology, Ψ(r kmt , w t ) = max
he optimal decision of the firm implies
, so profit function becomes:
For household to invest in both capitals,
When on the MBGP, the firm will use the Solow technology if Ψ(r m ,ŵ m ) ≥ 0,
, bothr m andŵ m are functions of N 0 , the turning point
. Given q t−1 , N t , L, and
, and ψ =
(1−θ)φ θµ
Thus the equilibrium n * mt solves f (n * mt ) = 0 where
and 1 − µ − φ > 0 and t ≥ t * implies f 0 < 0, f (0) > 0 and f (1) < 0, thus there exists an unique n * mt ∈ [0, 1). Moreover, n * mt converges to zero if
is increasing in t which is true if assume
Solow Balanced Growth Path (SBGP) As n mt → 0, both r Lt → 0 and q t → 0. Assume,
the economy converges to a SBGP where output per worker (y st ) is growing at a constant rate. The capital-output ratio equal v s1 /π s , where v s1 = β(1−θ)
is the ratio for an economy with π s = 1, and
The wage and consumption also grow at γ It says that population growth rate first increases until the living standard is x 1 times its Malthusian level and the decreases to a constant level when the living standard is x 2 times its Malthusian level. The g (.) is then calibrated to this shape with x 1 = 2, x 2 = 18 and m = 2 where m = 2 corresponds to a 2% average annual population growth rate. Finally, γ s and β are chosen so that the growth rate is around 2% for postwar periods, and interest rate is around 2% in Malthus era and 4-4.5% for the postwar periods. To summarize, the parameter values are θ µ φ γ m γ s β x 1 x 2 m 0.4 0.6 0.1 1.03 1.52 1 2 18 2
Given L, N 0 and K 0 , q t is solved using the shooting algorithm described in Hansen and Prescott.
Appendix 3. Sensitivity Analysis I examine the robustness of the shape of Figure ( 6) with respect to changes in parameters of the model. These parameters are initial population, quality of land, initial TFP levels for the Malthus and Solow technologies, input shares for Malthus technology, population growth rate along the Malthus balanced growth path, and the population growth function g(c 1 ). Figure A1 shows that doubling initial population, quality of land and Am A s all have insignificant effects on the shape of the income ratio curve. Given the Malthus sector almost disappear three periods after modern growth begins, both capital and land shares of the Malthus technology have an insignificant effect on the income ratio curve. Doubling the population growth rate along the Malthus balanced growth path from 0.3 percent to 0.6 percent will increase γ m from 1.03 to 1.07. This again is insignificant in determining the income ratio curve since consumption is doubled two periods after modern growth begins, and after this point γ m does not enter into g(c 1 ). I check the robustness of shape of income difference by varying x 1 , x 2 and m. Figure A2 shows that both x1 and x2 have an insignificant effect on the maximum income ratio but m has a significant effect. By increasing the maximum annual population growth rate from 2% to 3% (m = 2 to m = 2.81), the maximum income ratio is increased from 3.2 to 3.5 (a nearly 10 percent increase). -99 1905-09 1915-19 1925-29 1935-39 1945-49 Relative capital good prices
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